Stationarity Tests

Cointegration Tests
tests the time series properties of the residuals from the models reported in Table   1 of the paper. The strong evidence of stationarity indicates the series are cointegrated.
This result is consistent with our theoretical expectations and supports our decision to estimate single equation Error Correction Models. The measure we elected to focus on in relation to the filibuster is based on preference divergence-the distance between the Senate median and filibuster pivot. But this measure fails to capture shifts in norms that may have contributed to the rise of fili-busters in the Senate. While we do include a measure of policy output that would in part capture the effects of filibusters beyond preference divergence, a more direct way to examine the effect of norms versus preference divergence as a predictor of income inequality is to include measures of filibuster activity. While measuring filibuster activity is not as straightforward as one might initially assume (Koger 2010) , the number of cloture motions filed is a fairly reasonable proxy.
In Table 3 we report two models that attempt to more directly assess norms versus preference divergence. We re-estimate Model 1 from the table reported in the paper, but add two different measures of filibuster activity. In the first model we add the number of cloture motions filed. In this model, there is no effect for cloture motions while the results reported in the paper remain essentially unchanged. Due to potential concerns regarding collinearity between Senate polarization and cloture motions (p=0.62) we also regressed cloture motions on filibuster pivot distance and captured the residuals in order to create a version of the cloture motions variable that is uncorrelated with the filibuster pivot distance. This variable is used in Model 2 here. Again, no substantial change in the results reported in the paper are revealed. Overall, these results point to preference divergence in the Senate as a key status quo bias explanation of U.S. income inequality.
Alternative Specifications and Estimation Techniques
In Table 4 we report three models to which we made reference in the text of the paper.
In the first model, re-estimate model 2 from the paper, but control for the ideological position of the House and Senate as opposed to party control. The measure we use here is the Common Space DW-NOMINATE score for the median member of each chamber (Carroll, Lewis, Lo, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2011) . The results here are substantively identical to the results reported in the analogous model in the paper. The second model re-estimates model 1 from the paper while controlling for party of the president. The party of president is statistically insignifcant and the results for the key theoretical variables remain unchanged. The third model re-estimates model 1 from the paper but without a correction for autocorrelation. Here, the results are quite similar but two variables that are statistically significant with the correction for autocorrelation are not significant without such a correction. In these cases, the estimates are in the same direction and of similar magnitude. There is good reason to suspect that filibuster pivot distance, maximum preference distance, congressional policy product, and general ideological polarization are highly correlated. This raises the question of whether the measures we describe as indicators of status quo bias are truly any different than general polarization, which has already been incorporated into the U.S. income inequality literature (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006) .
Exploring Issues of Collinearity between Key Explanatory Variables
In fact, there are some moderate to strong correlations among these four variables as seen in Table 5 . But observed correlations are not sufficiently strong to conclude that the status quo bias measures are simply other indicators of polarization. There are, nonetheless, some moderate to strong correlations present here. Because of this we estimated four very simple models that examine each of these four variables in isolation, one at a time. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6 .
These models add additional support to the core conclusions reached in the paper.
Of the three status quo bias variables and general polarization, the two variables that matter most consistently for distributional outcomes are filibuster pivot distance and congressional policy product. The interaction of both these variables with existing levels of inequality are also basically consistent with the fuller specifications reported in the paper. Just as in the original analysis, maximum preference distance has no effect, even excluding polarization and filibuster pivot distance, the two variables most strongly correlated with preference distance, from the model. These results drive home the point that we must look beyond general polarization as an explanation for inequality. More specific measures of polarization that account for the institutional structure of U.S. government, particularly the important role of the Senate, are more effective explanations of income inequality over time.
